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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3142 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LACEY GRAVES, 
       Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2-06-cr-00095-01)  
District Judge:  Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 26, 2015 
 
Before:   GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 28, 2015) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION  
_______________ 
 
 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.   
 Lacey Graves, who was convicted by a jury of bank robbery, appeals the District 
Court’s decision to deny his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
We will vacate the District Court’s order in part, affirm in part, and remand for further 
consideration in light of our recent decision in United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 635 (3d 
Cir. 2015).   
I. 
 Graves was tried three times for bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), 
and for use of a firearm during the commission of a violent felony, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c).  The District Court declared a mistrial in the first two trials after the jury 
failed to reach a verdict.  At the third trial, the jury found Graves guilty of the bank 
robbery charge and acquitted him of the firearm charge, and the District Court sentenced 
him to a term of 180 months’ imprisonment, a term of supervised release of five years, 
restitution of $6,421, and a special assessment of $100.  Graves appealed the conviction, 
and we affirmed.  See United States v. Graves, 373 F. App’x 229, 232-34 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 Graves subsequently filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his trial 
counsel did not provide effective assistance, as defined by Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), because they failed to call Leslie Neal as a witness and failed to make a 
motion to suppress items seized from Neal’s home.1  The District Court denied Graves’ 
                                              
1  Graves previously had argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
acquire and authenticate the original bank surveillance tapes, but withdrew this claim at a 
hearing before the District Court.   
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§ 2255 motion, but granted a certificate of appealability on the suppression issue.  We 
expanded the certificate of appealability to include counsel’s failure to call Neal as a 
witness.  We will address these two Strickland issues in turn.   
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In a § 2255 proceeding, we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clear error 
standard to its findings of fact.  United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 
2014).   
II. 
 To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show (1) 
that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Our review of counsel’s 
performance “must be highly deferential” so as “to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight,” and we therefore “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 689.  To 
establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. at 694.     
A. 
 First, Graves argues that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance 
because counsel failed to call his girlfriend, Leslie Neal, as a witness.  The District Court 
held that this Strickland claim failed because Graves’ counsel “made a strategic decision 
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not to call Neal as a witness” and that “[t]his decision was not so unreasonable as to be 
constitutionally deficient.”  United States v. Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d 758, 775 (E.D. Pa. 
2013).  We agree.   
 Strickland requires that a defendant “overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”  466 U.S. 
at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).  If the Government “can show that counsel 
actually pursued an informed strategy (one decided upon after a thorough investigation of 
the relevant law and facts),” the effectiveness of counsel’s assistance is “virtually 
unchallengeable.”  Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 500 (3d Cir. 2005).    
 The Government argues, convincingly, that Graves’ counsel opted not to call 
Leslie Neal as a witness because her testimony harmed Graves’ case more than it helped.  
Graves’ counsel had observed Neal’s testimony at the first two trials and determined that 
she lacked credibility as a witness.  Neal had testified previously that, on the day of the 
robbery, she dropped Graves at a Walmart near the bank and drove to meet a drug dealer 
to purchase marijuana for Graves.  Unable to find the drug dealer and wanting to know 
the time, she pulled into the bank parking lot, covered her head with a scarf to protect 
herself from the rain, and looked through the bank’s glass doors in search of a clock on 
the wall.2  The Government offered the alternative explanation that Neal had parked in 
the bank’s parking lot, covered her face with a scarf to obscure her identity, and peered in 
                                              
2  Neal testified at a hearing before the District Court that, had she been called as a 
witness at the third trial, her testimony would have been substantially similar to her 
testimony from the first two trials.   
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to the bank’s windows to case the bank for Graves’ robbery.  In support, the Government 
offered the eyewitness testimony of a bank teller who had been so unnerved by Neal’s 
behavior that she had tried to copy down Neal’s license plate number.   
 Graves argues that Leslie Neal would have rebutted other witnesses’ testimony 
and provided an alternative account of Graves’ actions at the time of the robbery, relying 
on cases holding that the failure to call a crucial alibi witness or to investigate the 
existence of an alibi witness might constitute deficient performance.  See, e.g., Adams v. 
Bertrand, 453 F.3d 428, 436-38 (7th Cir. 2006).  The record here, however, does not 
support this argument and renders these cases inapposite.  Graves’ defense at the third 
trial focused on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications of the masked robber.  
Neal’s testimony, assuming it was consistent with her testimony from the two previous 
trials, would have compromised this defense by placing Graves in close physical 
proximity to the bank without otherwise accounting for his actions at the time.  The 
record therefore demonstrates that Graves’ counsel opted not to call Neal based on an 
informed, reasoned belief that her testimony would hurt a potentially viable defense and 
that counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to call her as a witness for the third 
trial.  Counsel’s decision thus cannot be deemed deficient under Strickland.   
B. 
 Second, Graves argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
because of their failure to move to suppress evidence found in Neal’s home based on the 
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search warrant’s lack of particularity.3  That evidence included Graves’ New Balance 
sneakers, which a forensic examiner with the Federal Bureau of Investigation with 
specialized training in shoeprint examinations testified could have been responsible for 
the footwear impressions found at the crime scene, as well as purchase receipts totaling 
$226.03.   
 The District Court held that Graves failed to prove effective assistance because, 
although it concluded that counsel was deficient in failing to move to suppress a facially 
defective warrant, Graves did not prove prejudice.4  Specifically, the District Court held 
that (1) counsel’s motion to suppress would have been granted under our then-existing 
case law, Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (citing Groh, 540 U.S. at 563-65); but 
concluded that (2) the jury would have convicted Graves in any event on the basis of the 
other evidence introduced at trial, so there was no “reasonable probability that, without 
that evidence, Graves would not have been found guilty.”  Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 
775.  
                                              
3  Graves’ counsel had moved to suppress on probable cause grounds, but had not 
argued that the search warrant lacked particularity.   
 
4  In holding that counsel’s performance was deficient, the District Court relied 
solely on Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004), which held that suppression was 
required where “the warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all.”  However, the 
warrant in Graves’s case, in contrast, merely failed to expressly incorporate the attached 
affidavit.  Moreover, between the Supreme Court’s decision in Groh and the time of 
Graves’ trial, we declined to suppress under Groh where the warrant was not so 
fundamentally flawed.  E.g., United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 393-94 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Thus, although we resolve Graves’s ineffective assistance claim on other grounds, we are 
doubtful that the performance of the highly experienced defense counsel in this case 
would be deemed deficient even under our earlier case law.     
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 The Government asks us to affirm on the second part of the District Court’s 
rationale, i.e., even assuming a motion to suppress had been made and granted, there was 
no reasonable probability of a verdict other than guilty.  We cannot agree.5  Having 
elicited the testimony of the FBI expert linking the sneakers to the shoe prints found at 
the bank, the Government reiterated the importance of the FBI expert’s testimony in its 
closing argument, stating that the sneakers were “valuable” evidence because they were 
“a match” with footprints found at the scene of the crime, though it conceded that they 
were not an “exclusive match.”6  (Supp. App. 615-16.)  Further, the Government used the 
sneakers to tie Graves to Leslie Neal, who it alleged had cased the bank and then driven 
off in Graves’ car.  The fact that Graves’ sneakers were found at Neal’s apartment 
strengthened the Government’s argument that Graves entrusted Neal with casing the bank 
and driving his car—the same car that had been identified by a partial license plate 
number at the scene of the crime and that the Government asserted Neal had driven away 
after casing the bank.  The New Balance sneakers thus played a significant role in the 
Government’s case, and even the Government concedes on appeal that the evidence from 
the search of Neal’s home was “certainly probative.”  Appellee’s Br. 33. 
 We must evaluate the prejudicial effect of counsel’s performance “in light of the 
totality of evidence at trial: a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record 
                                              
5  We may examine Strickland’s two prongs in whatever order is most practical.  See 
Gov’t of V.I. v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 165 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 
6  In determining the impact of evidence on a jury verdict for our analysis of the 
prejudice prong, we have observed that the Government’s “closing argument is 
revealing.”  Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2013).   
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is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record 
support.”  Grant, 709 F.3d at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the District 
Court may well be correct that the evidence in question did not have a “strong impact” on 
the trial, it was also correct that this case was a quintessential example of a “close case.”  
Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 774.  Indeed, it was such a close case, with the first two trials 
ending with hung juries, that even a weak impact may well have altered the outcome.  
Thus, given the role the sneakers played in the Government’s case, we conclude, contrary 
to the District Court, that Graves satisfied his burden to show “a reasonable probability 
that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.”7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694.  That conclusion, however, assumes that a motion to suppress would have been 
granted, so we turn now to the validity of that assumption.   
 In Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009), the Supreme Court 
expanded the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule by holding that evidence is 
suppressed when police behavior in violation of the Fourth Amendment is “deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent,” but not when it is the result of simple, isolated negligence.  
Id. at 147-48.  The District Court identified a circuit split as to whether Herring applied 
to facially invalid warrants and noted “competing Third Circuit interpretations” in Virgin 
Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2011)—which the District Court 
characterized as holding that a search based on a facially invalid search warrant per se 
involves conduct that is deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent—and United States v. 
                                              
7  We agree with the District Court, however, that the evidence of $226.03 of 
purchase receipts did not have any effect on the outcome of the trial given that the 
Government also introduced receipts for over $1,300.00 found in Graves’ car.   
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Wright, 493 F. App’x 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Wright I”)—a non-precedential opinion 
holding that the “assumption that a facially invalid warrant automatically triggered a per 
se application of the exclusionary rule” without assessing the officer’s culpability was 
“erroneous.”  Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 769-72.  Recognizing that Wright I was “not 
binding precedent in this circuit,” the District Court concluded it was bound to follow 
John, and accordingly held that the evidence would have been suppressed regardless of 
the officer’s mental state.  Id. at 772-74 (quoting Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 
331 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 We rejected that approach in a precedential opinion, however, when the Wright 
case returned to us on a subsequent appeal.  United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 635 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“Wright II”).8  Presented with facts very similar to Graves’ case, we held that 
even if a warrant is facially invalid, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances 
to assess if the officer was “sufficiently culpable for the costs of suppression to outweigh 
its benefits.”  Id. at 639, 642; see also United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 144-47 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  While the District Court did not have the benefit of Wright II when it reached 
its decision, our opinion in that case makes clear that an individual officer’s mental state 
is relevant and that a suppression motion should be granted only if the officer acted 
deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence.  777 F.3d at 638.  Wright II also 
instructs District Courts evaluating an officer’s culpability to consider (1) the extent to 
                                              
8  We consider current developments in the law in assessing Strickland’s prejudice 
prong so as to determine whether counsel’s performance “deprive[s] the defendant of any 
substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him.”  See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 
506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).    
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which the violation undermined the purposes of the Fourth Amendment: assuring in 
writing that the magistrate found probable cause to search and seize the items mentioned, 
preventing “general searches,” and informing the subject of the search of the scope of the 
search; and (2) what the Government gained from the violation.  Id. at 640.   
 On remand following Wright I, the District Court made findings that the officers’ 
“failure to review the warrant before executing it was a ‘simple mistake’ that conferred 
no benefit on the Government and amounted at most to negligence.”  Id. at 638.  In 
affirming, we observed that the magistrate judge had found probable cause to search for 
and seize every item listed in the affidavit; that it was not a “general search” because the 
officer who filled out the warrant ensured that the officers complied with the warrant; and 
that the Government did not gain anything from the violation because it would have 
seized and presented at trial the same evidence if the warrant were valid.  Id. at 640-42.  
Thus, even though the subject of the search in that case had not been informed of its 
scope because the affidavit was not attached to the warrant, we held the relevant 
considerations weighed in favor of the officer and suppression was not warranted.  Id. at 
641-42.   
 Here, the record also strongly indicates that the officer’s conduct was merely 
negligent.  Although the section on the face of the warrant describing the property to be 
seized was left blank, an attachment accompanying the warrant listed the items to be 
seized, including “shoes consistent with footprints recovered from crime scene” (App. 
217); a magistrate judge reviewed the warrant and authorized the search; and the FBI 
agent who had completed the warrant subsequently searched Neal’s home, confining his 
11 
 
search to the items in the attachment.  Moreover, the Government has represented that, if 
permitted to supplement the record in the District Court, it would establish that the 
attachment also was presented to the magistrate judge and, subsequently, to the occupant 
of Neal’s home in connection with the search.  Because the District Court erroneously 
concluded the officers’ mental state was irrelevant, however, it did not make findings of 
fact concerning the officers’ culpability.  We therefore will remand in light of Wright II 
for the District Court to undertake such fact finding in the first instance.9        
III. 
 In sum, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying Graves’ § 2255 motion, 
affirm the District Court’s holding that Graves was not deprived of his right to effective 
assistance because his counsel failed to call Neal as a witness, and remand to the District 
Court so it may assess the officer’s culpability as required by Wright II.   
                                              
9  Graves argues in the alternative that even if we determine that he is not entitled to 
relief on the basis of his Strickland claims, that his counsel’s failure to call Neal as a 
witness and failure to object to the search warrant’s lack of particularity together 
constituted cumulative error that “undermined the fundamental fairness of [Graves’] trial 
and denied him the constitutional right to due process.”  Appellant’s Br. at 35 (quoting 
Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)).  This argument fails because we have 
concluded that counsel’s decision not to call Neal as a witness was not deficient, and 
cumulative error analysis only applies when we identify more than one error.  See 
Williams v. Superintendent, SCI Greene, No. 11-4319, 2012 WL 6057929, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 4, 2012).    
